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A B S T R A C T
This paper aims to explain why parental informal payments emerge and then spread in dif-
ferentmanners in Kyrgyzstani schools and to examine their interaction as informal institutions
with the school as a formal one. It is argued that the main reason behind informal pay-
ments is the survival of the schools; parents’ acceptance of them was a result of necessity.
In a small percentage of experiences where marketization of public schools was success-
ful, there was a socioeconomic segregation of pupils, advancing toward a de facto privatization
of public schools. Then, while the key logic behind informal payments was the upgrading
or elitization of schools, the nature of the engagement of givers and receivers was by choice
rather than by necessity. Finally, following Helmke and Levitsky (2004), I link the survival
strategy to a substitutive relationship to formal public school outcomes, and to the elitization
strategy, a competing nature with the formal logic of Kyrgyzstani basic education. Special
attention is given to the social function approach toward informal economy practices, and
to the signiﬁcance of social stratiﬁcation on how those informal practices work. The paper
focuses on the comparison of informal payments in two schools representing the two strat-
egies previously described: an elitnaya school from the center of Bishkek, the 13th Gymnasium
School; and the conventional 21st Middle School in the novostroika (new settlement) of
Enesay, the capital’s periphery. The ﬁeldwork of this research was developed in two stays
during the months of July/August and October/November in 2011.
Copyright © 2016 Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of Asia-Paciﬁc
Research Center, Hanyang University. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-
ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
After the disintegration of the USSR and the Soviet
system, Kyrgyzstan experienced a sharp decline in state
funding of education. Public spending on education was cut
in half, from 7.9% of total public spending in 1990 to 3.7%
in 2000 (Mertaugh, 2004, 172). Simultaneously, a package
of reforms was implemented, aimed at introducing market
mechanisms into public education that would permit self-
ﬁnancing through the introduction of additional pay services
and the creation of donor funds and commercial classes, an
enclave of mixed public–private funding within public
schools. Starting in themid-nineties it became apparent that
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schools were underfunded and parental informal payments1
became an extended and institutionalized practice.
The general objectives of this paper are twofold. First,
the author aims to explain why parental informal pay-
ments emerge and then spread in different manners. To do
so, we examine their relationship to formal mechanisms of
marketization in education. In doing so, special attention
is given both to theoretical perspectives supporting a social
function approach (Cassidy, 2011; Morris & Polese, 2014;
Stenning, Smith, Rochovská, & Swiatek, 2010) toward in-
formal economy practices2 and to the signiﬁcance of social
stratiﬁcation when analyzing how those informal prac-
tices work (Williams, 2011). This paper argues, on the one
hand, that the primary reason for the importation of infor-
mal payments from higher education and health sectors to
Kyrgyzstani elementary and secondary schools was the in-
suﬃcient funding schools received in a context of declining
public funds and a general breakdown of new legally mar-
keted services. With the main reason behind informal
payments being the survival of the schools, parents’ accep-
tance of them was a result of necessity. Unlike the
transitional discourse of neo-liberal scholars, parental in-
formal payments are not a Soviet legacy bound to disappear.
Formal public and private funding are still insuﬃcient, and
state and economic institutions are still dominated by in-
formal practices. On the other hand, while formal education
marketization mechanisms have not provided solutions for
the lack of either funding or transparency in cost-sharing
tools, they have reinforced the use of parental informal pay-
ments quantitatively and qualitatively. In particular, in the
small percentage of experiences where marketization was
successful, school directors discovered a path to the greater
commodiﬁcation of education oriented toward generat-
ing the socioeconomic segregation of pupils. This process
was possible by expanding market logic to informal pay-
ments and, thus, advancing toward a de facto privatization
of public schools. That is, while the key logic behind infor-
mal payments was the upgrading or elitization of schools,
the nature of the engagement of givers and receivers was
by choice rather than by necessity.
School managements’ solution of promoting the
elitization of the school by increasing the informal pay-
ments demanded from parents has also affected the nature
of the interaction between informal payments and the
formal institution (the public school) that receives them.
Thus, building upon the literature of informal institutions,
the second objective of this paper is to examine the inter-
action between formal and informal institutions. Following
the framework created by Helmke and Levitsky (2004), I
complete the criteria that divide the main categories of pa-
rental informal payments by adding to the survival strategy,
the substitutive relationship to formal public school out-
comes, and to the elitization strategy, a competing nature
with the formal logic of Kyrgyzstani basic education. There-
fore, the relevance of social stratiﬁcation on how parental
informal payments are analyzed leads to three questions.
Do parents engage in this informal economic practice by ne-
cessity or by choice? Is the strategy behind parental informal
payments the school’s survival or its upgrading and
elitization? Finally, is the relationship of interaction that in-
formal payments have with the formal logic of the
Kyrgyzstani state either substituting or competing?
This introduction is followed by an examination and dis-
cussion of the main theoretical approaches to this research.
The second part provides a general assessment of the mo-
tivations behind parental informal payments and a typology
of them. The third part is dedicated to comparing infor-
mal payments in two schools representing the two strategies
previously described: informal payments as part of an
elitization strategy/competing interaction and informal pay-
ments as part of a survival strategy/substituting interaction.
Thus, one school is an elitnaya (elite) school from the center
of Bishkek, the 13th Gymnasium School also known as
Trinashka; and the other is the (conventional) 21st Middle
School in the novostroika (new settlement) of Enesay, the
capital’s periphery. By focusing on these two schools at the
beginning of the nineties, before parental informal pay-
ments existed, we have the opportunity to isolate the effects
of the presence of marketization mechanisms and differ-
entmanagement strategies through a process–tracing paired
comparison (Tarrow, 2010). The two schools were se-
lected randomly as examples of two school types, elitnaya
and conventional.
The ﬁeldwork of this researchwas developed in two stays
during the months of July/August and October/November
in 2011. The data collection methodology includes semi-
structured interviews with parents, teachers and director
of studies from several schools and also 5-parents discus-
sion groups from the Schools No.13 and No.21. I looked for
two main types of empirical information. On the one hand,
the narratives of both parental and school personnel engaged
in informal payments either in survival or elitization strat-
egies. On the other hand, I searched for quantitative data
concerning the amount and the frequency of payments as
well as qualitative descriptions of the process behind this
informal economy practice. The data gathered in inter-
views and discussion groups allowed me to contrast
information provided in other reports and papers, and also
to assess to what extent the Trinashka and the School No.21
were representatives of the group of schools they be-
longed. In addition, the research includes semi-structured
in-depth interviews to near twenty local experts on edu-
cation, government oﬃcials from the education sector, MPs
of the Jogorku Kenesh (Parliament) and other representa-
tives of political parties, education sector trade unionist, and
members of both local NGO (ErEp, Door Eli, El Pikir) and
international agencies of cooperation (USAID) which have
developed projects focused on the education and the issue
1 “Informal payments” are all kind of payments not oﬃcially sanc-
tioned and/or collected by the state or local government as a prerequisite
for school attendance. Such paymentsmay include admission, private family
costs for learning materials, class supplies and transportation; special ac-
tivities such as ﬁeld trips and tutoring services (both legal and illegal/
extra-legal); renovations, equipment, utilities, supplementary payments
to teachers and principals’ wages and regular education services which
are underfunded by the state, among others (deﬁnition modiﬁed from
ESP/NEPC, 2010, 19).
2 The informal economy can be viewed as the production and sale of
goods and services that are licit in every sense other than being unre-
corded by, or hidden from, the state for tax, beneﬁt and/or labor law
purposes (European Commission, 2007; International Labour Organization,
2002). This category does not include goods or services which are illegal
in themselves, such as illegal drug or arms sales.
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of parental informal payments. Finally, the data collection
has been supported by a deep review of local press and par-
liamentary and NGO reports.
2. Theories and debates about informal payments
This paper tackles two relevant theoretical debates in the
study of informal economy practices, and informal pay-
ments in particular: how and why parental informal
payments emerge and persist over time, and the nature of
the interaction between formal and informal institutions.
Both these questions are analyzed within the context of the
stratiﬁed nature of Kyrgyzstani society, and as a conse-
quence, the impact of the social class to which the involved
population groups belong is emphasized.
A key cleavage among competing explanations for the
emergence and the persistence of informal economy prac-
tices appears between the so-called formalization or
modernization thesis (Massey, 2005;Williams, 2011, 26) and
certain other theoretical efforts that have abandoned a binary
and hierarchical understanding of the relationship between
formal and informal economy practices. In the formaliza-
tion thesis, the informal economy is a residue of an old
mode of production and consumption, which, as a sign of
backwardness, is bound to disappear as a logical and inev-
itable progression toward the formation of a formal economy
(Geertz, 1973; Latouche, 1993, 49). In the ﬁeld of informal
payments in post-socialist countries there are two main
theoretical strands that maintain this view along with a
strong rejection of what they consider a morally unjusti-
ﬁable and economically ineffective example of corruption.
On the one hand, the policy-oriented scholarship pro-
moted by international organizations such as Transparency
International regards informal payments as only provok-
ing state and market ineﬃciency (Morris & Polese, 2014).
On the other hand, the neo-liberal school (De Soto, 1989;
Minc, 1982) blames the over-regulation of the market for
most economic shortcomings and considers the informal
economy as a legacy that will disappear with the expan-
sion of the free-market, economic growth and globalization
(Åslund, 2007).
In contrast, in recent decades there has been wide-
spread recognition that the informal economy not only
generates growth (Hart, 1973, 61), but also mitigates the
failings of the formal economy and ensures social repro-
duction (Stenning et al., 2010). A growing group of scholars
depict the informal economy as a persistent and even
growing realm. This body of knowledge includes critical,
post-colonial, post-structuralist and post-capitalist theo-
rists (e.g. Escobar, 1995; Gibson-Graham, 1996, 2006;
Leyshon, Lee, & Williams, 2003; Morris & Polese, 2014;
Williams, 2005, 2011). The discipline of economic geogra-
phy provided the ﬁrst wave of seminal works critical of the
transition and its “unintended consequences” (Burawoy &
Verdery, 1999, p. 1), or studies challenging market-centered
neo-liberal approaches by emphasizing the existence of
“diverse economies” (Gibson-Graham, 1996, 2006). Fur-
thermore, a number of ethnographic accounts of post-
socialism belonging to “survival strategies” (Bridger & Pine,
1998) explored the broad range of community responses
to the socioeconomic challenges, which involved prac-
tices such as self-provisioning, exchange and barter.
Regarding informal payments, the debate between law based
approaches that understand all payments as corruption and
socially-embedded, and diverse economies scholarship has
generated enough examples of literature revealing the social
function of certain informal payments (Kotkin & Sajó, 2002;
Morris & Polese, 2014). In Kyrgyzstan, it is mostly in rural
areas where parental informal payments and contribu-
tions to the survival of the schools can be understood as a
collective and non-capitalist alternative. The stronger com-
munity involvement allows us to identify a genuine survival
strategy since individuals’ perceptions of being engaged in
a broader social goal is sharper. In Bishkek and other urban
areas, even most of the honest management survival strat-
egies are deeply individualized.
The subjugation of the post-socialist state to the neo-
liberal agenda led to deep changes in its infrastructural
capacities. As Morris and Polese (2014, 8) assess, state–
society relations were compelled to adapt to marketized
relations, as a rapid reduction inpublic resources fromwelfare
institutions and of social protection of the most disadvan-
taged took place. Buisson (2007) accurately referred to the
1990s as aperiodof state-dismantling rather than statebuild-
ing. Analyzing that context, the literaturementioned in the
previous paragraph tracks the strategies followed by real
people to solve their problems in a period where the ex-
plosionof social inequalities coincideswith adecline in social
services. Informal practices that do not fulﬁll Western po-
litical correctness have ensured social reproduction by
mitigating the failures of the state (Stenning et al., 2010).
In particular, informal payments in sectors such as health
and education provided – and provide – key resources for
the survival of these institutions as universal public ser-
vices, allowing a further re-construction of thewelfare state
from below (Kordonsky, 2012; Morris & Polese, 2014).
Notwithstanding the beneﬁts of informal economy prac-
tices in some contexts, we need to recognize that there are
many forms in which informal economy practices, and spe-
ciﬁcally informal payments, produce damaging impacts
(Kordonsky, 2012; Morris & Polese, 2014). Informal pay-
ments become plain corruption when they are linked to
rent-seeking behavior, regardless of the ﬂows being verti-
cal or horizontal. Additionally, the impact of informal
payments on the society has its darker side, establishing an
inequitable access to fundamental services such as health-
care or education. The standardization of informal payments
correlated to rent-seeking behavior supports the consoli-
dation of that inequality. In my own ﬁeldwork for this paper
I was able to test how informal admission fees and other
‘gatekeeping’ payments were at the same time key for the
survival of the schools, but on occasion an insurmount-
able barrier for poor households whose children ultimately
remained outside the educational system.
Moreover, variations in the nature of informal economy
practices and in their relationship to formal institutions
depend on which social classes are involved. The inﬂu-
ence of social stratiﬁcation on the ontological divides within
informal economy practices is a ﬁeld that should be re-
searched further. In one of the few examples, Williams
(2011) shows in his study on informal work in Moscow that
different relationships between formal and informal spheres
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apply to different population groups, i.e. deprived or aﬄu-
ent populations. In his view, the nature of the informal work
matches with the by-product thesis (Amin, Cameron, &
Hudson, 2002; Castells & Portes, 1989) that depicts this prac-
tice as a substitute for formal work, with marginalized
populations engaged in this domain as a necessity rather
than a choice. In contrast, aﬄuent populations get in-
volved by choice in informal works that act as complements
to their formal activities.Williams’ approach indicates a clear
distinction for why people engage in informal economy
practices – either by necessity or by choice – that is also
applicable to informal payments in basic education. In Kyr-
gyzstan during the 1990s, structural adjustment policies
meant that most communities had to confront state dys-
function by implementing survival strategies to save essential
services, such as education. The reason behind parental in-
formal payments was the necessity to contribute ﬁnancially
to ensure the survival of schools. But in a smaller number
of schools, the most prestigious ones during late social-
ism, parental informal payments were developed by choice
to upgrade the schools. Consequently, up to now I have pre-
sented two criteria that divide the categories of parental
informal payments based on the general objective behind
them and the nature of the engagement between the giver
and the receiver. However, there remains another criteri-
on to distinguish them: their interaction with the logic of
the formal institution.
Informal institutions interact in different manners with
the formal institutions with which they have relations, sub-
stituting or competing with them (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004;
Lauth, 2000). Helmke and Levitsky’s (2004) framework is
based on four patterns of formal–informal institutional in-
teraction: complementary and accommodating (when formal
institutions are effective), and competing and substitutive
(with ineffective formal institutions, as is the case of Kyr-
gyzstan). If ineffective formal institutions and informal
institutions share outcomes, then the latter substitute for the
former, carrying out their alleged functions. In contrast, if out-
comes are divergent, the relationship is competitive.
The socioeconomic context and the management strat-
egy of a school inﬂuences not only the nature of the
commodiﬁcation of education, but also the relationship of
interaction that parental informal payments have with
the formal logic of the Kyrgyzstani state providing public
education. Since the Kyrgyzstani state is openly ineffec-
tive in this regard (Dobretsova & Gaybulina, 2011; UNDP
Kyrgyzstan, 2010), two main types of interaction can be
identiﬁed. On the one hand, while most common schools
receiving informal payments are mostly moved by a strat-
egy of survival, I suggest that they are not only substituting
state functions but sharing outcomes. On the other hand,
some schools has a management strategy proﬁt oriented,
in which the informal payments are higher and aimed
both to upgrade the academic level provided and to attract
pupils from upper-middle and upper classes. This strategy
has led to an elitization of the schools that openly opposes
the constitutional principles of equal quality and accessi-
bility to basic education. Hence, this de facto privatization
of schools (Osipian, 2009a, 2009b; Polese, 2006) can be
regarded as a competing interaction with formal public
education.
3. Parental informal payments in Kyrgyzstani schools:
from survival to elitization
Parental informal payments were not prevalent during
the Soviet period. The only widespread form of exchanging
favors was giving gifts to teachers and – in a lesser degree,
private lessons (Rasanayagam, 2011, 689). Uniforms, in-
kind contributions formaking repairs and cleaning subotnikis
were the other “private” costs at school. Although itwas not
apracticeonamassbasis, themost inﬂuential practicewithin
basic education in that time was the use of blat3 connec-
tions (Ledeneva, 1998, 28–29) to get access to a better school
(elitanaya) or kindergarten. A key differentiation between
late socialism and post-socialism in this regard is that in the
former, period exchanges were non-monetary while in the
latter monetary exchanges dominate.
Anyway,many informal transactions imported intopublic
school after independence were already strongly embed-
ded in the higher education (Drummond&DeYoung, 2002;
Osipian, 2009a, 2009b; Sanghera& Ilyasov, 2008) andhealth-
care sectors (Falkingham, Akkazieva, & Baschieri, 2010). In
late socialism, an informal economy that functioned in par-
allel to the oﬃcial centralized planned system emerged,
which is based on elements strategically locatedwithin the
system of bureaucratic management of economic produc-
tionanddistribution inCentralAsia. The relationshipbetween
the formal and informal was one of full and mutual inter-
dependence (Rasanayagam, 2011, 688). Today, the informal
economy covers 50% of the total production (OECD, 2010,
33) and is equivalent to more than 50% of the Kyrgyzstani
GDP (UNDP Kyrgyzstan, 2006, 4). Inside informal economy
is the 70% of workforce (ILO, 2011, 7; Nasritdinov, Rayapova,
Kholmatova, Damirbek, & Igoshina, 2010).
On the road that was to lead Kyrgyzstan to supposed mo-
dernity, the neo-liberal agenda implemented as a result of
pressure from international donors had highly negative con-
sequences on the Kyrgyzstani state’s capacities as well as on
social equality. Thepost-socialist education reformpackagewas
imbuedwith the vocabulary of neo-liberalism (Amsler, 2009;
DeYoung, 2007; Steiner-Khamsi, 2004), and establishedmecha-
nisms and bodies for public–private co-ﬁnancing and
marketization. Themodel for Central Asian countries was the
“NewZealand Curriculum Framework” (Steiner-Khamsi, 2004,
222) andwasput intopractice followingdonors’ interests rather
than local needs (Silova & Steiner-Khamsi, 2008). As a result
of the combination of these reforms with the proliferation of
parental informal payments, the “education systemhasbecome
one of the prime sites in which ‘the market’ is encountered”
(Reeves, 2005, 11).
Theconsequenceof these reforms isa lessequitable system
(Hallak&Poisson, 2007;Heyneman, Anderson, &Nuraliyeva,
2008). The insuﬃcient funding of public schools was not re-
solvedby the combination of public spending and formal and
informal private co-ﬁnancing. According to a recent study,
45%of theneedsof rural schools and28%of theneedsof urban
schools are not fulﬁlled (Dobretsova&Gaybulina, 2011, 8–9).
3 “Blat is the use of personal networks and informal contacts to obtain
goods and services in short supply and to ﬁnd a way around formal pro-
cedures” (Ledeneva, 1998, 13).
208 R. Ruiz Ramas / Journal of Eurasian Studies 7 (2016) 205–219
Theright toaqualityeducation isaffectedby the lackof schools
(only inBishkekanextra20%outof the totalnumberof schools
is still required, Kim, 2010); the shortage of repairs, class sup-
plies and equipment; and ﬁnally by the state’s incapability
to update the teaching contingent and its poorworking con-
ditions (Komitet po Obrazovaniyu, Nauke, Kulture,
Informatsionnoy i Religioznoy Politike Jogorku Kenesha
Kyrgyzskoy Respubliki, 2011; OECD, 2010, 157; UNICEF
Kyrgyzstan, 2011, 47–56;UNDPKyrgyzstan, 2010, 146). Nev-
ertheless, themost pressing problem facing public education
inKyrgyzstan is thedeﬁcit in teachers. AUNESCOstudyplaces
that the system ismissing 23%of teachers it needs, and states
that 56% of all schools do not have enough teachers (UNICEF
Kyrgyzstan, 2009). Therefore, the Kyrgyzstani public educa-
tion does not offer free access, nor equal opportunities and
also does not guarantee a quality education. All of them rec-
ognized principles by the Kyrgyzstani legislation in the
provision of basic education (The Constitution of the Kyrgyz
Republic art. 1–2, art 3.2, art.16, 32 and 45, the Law on Ed-
ucation art. 3, 4, 5, 7, 16 and 17).
Hence, the manner in which systemic change took place
favored the growth of informal practices in public schools,
as parents, teachers and administrators were forced to ﬁnd
alternatives to ensure their survival. During a period inwhich
the state has ceased to effectively fund public education, pa-
rental payments intended to support schools’ basic needs
(which may include non-compulsory extracurricular ac-
tivities), that is, substituting the state to allow the “social
reproduction” (Stenning et al., 2010). As seen in Table 1 these
kinds of payments are oriented toward the survival of the
school; the engagement between the giver and receiver is
by necessity and follows a substitutive logic of interaction
with formal public education objectives. The other princi-
pal type of parental informal payments tackled are those
payments or contributions whose objective is to increase
the status of a school through ﬁnancing certain services; in
this case, engagement is by choice and outcomes have a
competing relationshipwith the state’s aim of providing uni-
versal basic education. The emergence of this form of
informal practice was connected to schools where the legal
paid educational services were implemented. For instance
in Bishkek, 23 out of 93 schools did, but these services were
only signiﬁcantly consolidated in less than the half of them.
They were oﬃcially required to provide free education to
the children living in their areas. Basically, the manag-
ement’s solution was to promote the elitization of the school
by increasing the informal payments demanded from
parents.
Making a distinction between informal payments that
are used to guarantee a public school’s survival and those
that are unmistakably aimed at its unoﬃcial stratiﬁcation
and elitization, also involves distinguishing when the
payment of a fee becomes a bribe. People involved in the
transaction do not necessarily fall into the corruption cat-
egory neither when they collect money to provide services
nor even when they receive some goods or money as ‘gifts’,
in an action of thankfulness with no obligation of reciproc-
ity, sincemost of the people are aware of themeager salaries
of teachers. The key point to distinguish bribery has to do
with the obligation of reciprocity to receive a preferential
treatment (Polese, 2008, 58). When parents are paying fees
directly related to the survival of the school, they do not nec-
essarily receive preferential treatment. In contrast, when
parents aﬃliated to an elitnaya school are aware that by
paying they obtain preferential treatment, they do partake
in an act of bribery.
Revenues from informal payments are used for multi-
ple purposes as it can be seen in the typology of
expenditures present in Table 2. There are payments that
only generate private beneﬁt. Hence, a third kind of moti-
vation related with informal payments may result from
education professionals making use of what Hart terms “in-
formal income opportunities” (Hart, 2006, 23–26): the
possibility they have of providing informal services for
money thanks to their role in the formal sector (licit such
as organizing events or illicit such as private tutoring). The
fourth and ﬁnal type of payments is fees imposed on parents
by teachers and administrators whose only objective is per-
sonal enrichment. They do not generate any beneﬁt for the
school or provide any extracurricular services to the student,
but support corrupt bureaucratic structures.
4. Informal payments at the strongest and the weakest
link: the elitnaya Trinashka and the 21st Srednaya
Shkola in the Novostroika of Enesay
In comparison with the rest of the country, parental in-
formal payments have had the greatest impact in Bishkek.
Quantitatively, they are found in a higher percentage of
schools, and the types of expenditures are more numer-
ous. Qualitatively, the number of reasons behind the
payments are higher as coexist survival and elitization strat-
egies, and the penetration of this practice in formal
sponsorship bodies is much greater. In addition, nowhere
else in the country have informal payments increased the
costs of education and the stratiﬁcation of schools as much
as in Bishkek. Comparing the 13th Gymnasium School and
the 21stMiddle-School (Srednaya Shkola) provides two dif-
ferent perspectives on the issue, twodifferent realitieswithin
the same city: survival versus elitization strategy, engage-
mentbynecessity versus choice; and substitutive interactions
with formal institutions versus competing interactions.
4.1. Historical and socio-economic background
of the schools
Located in the center of the city, the 13th Gymnasium
School was founded in 1938, and during the late Soviet
period it was known as the school where the children of
Table 1
Differences between parental informal payments in standard and elitnayas
schools.
Criteria Standard School Elitnaya School
Reasoning behind
payments
Survival of the school Elitization of
the school
Engagement of people By necessity By choice
Interaction with formal
institution (Public
Education)
Substitutive Competing
Author’s elaboration.
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Table 2
Typology of informal payments in Kyrgyzstani schools.
Range of items covered
by informal paymentsa
Is it a part or a need of
mandatory education?
Voluntary or
mandatory (to contribute
or to pay a fee?)
Are parental payments
recorded or unrecorded?
Amount in soms Frequency Transaction ﬂows through
principals, teachers or
sponsors funds
Beneﬁt
(Self, class, school)
Admission and late entry Yes Mandatory Unrecorded. Sometimes
informally recorded in
sponsor fund
2500–30.000 (640$)b One-time payment Principals and sponsors Self
Other “gatekeeping
opportunities”c
Yes Mandatory Unrecorded 1.000–5.000 One-time payments Principals and sponsors Self
Supplementary payments
to staffd
Yes, it refers to basic
education staff salaries
Mandatory Unrecorded – – Principals, teachers and
sponsors
School
Class supplies*,e Yes Mandatory Unrecorded Monthly payments: 200–
900 in Bishkek, 50–300 in
rural areas, and on request
once or twice a month:
50–300
Regular Teachers Class
Learning materials,
equipment and
technology
Yes Mandatory Unrecorded or informally
recorded in sponsor fund
Highly variable Sporadic Principals and sponsors School
Repairs Yes Mandatory Unrecorded or informally
recorded in sponsor fund
Highly variable Sporadic Principals and sponsors School
Maintenance (including
sporadic payments of
electricity, heating and
cleaning services)*
Yes Mandatory Unrecorded or informally
recorded in sponsor fund
Monthly payments: 200–
900 in Bishkek, 50–300 in
rural areas, and on request
once or twice a month:
50–300
Regular Class maintenance to
teachers and Heating,
Electricity or cleaning
services to principals and
sponsors.
Class
School events and visits No Mandatory Unrecorded Highly variable Sporadic Principals, teachers and
sponsors.
School
Textbook rental Yes Voluntary Informal record 20 soms per book One-time payment Principals and teachers Self
Security* No Mandatory Unrecorded or informally
recorded if Fund or NGO
Monthly payments: 200–
900 in Bishkek, 50–300 in
rural areas, and on request
once or twice a month:
50–300
Regular Principals and sponsors School
Extracurricular activities
(sport, arts, etc)
No Voluntary Unrecorded or informal
record
Highly variable Depends on school and
student
Principals and Teachers Self
Private tutoring No Voluntary Unrecorded 500–15,000 per year for
those students who have
private tutoring
Depends on school and
student
Teachers Self
Extra-group lessons No Voluntary Unrecorded or informal
record
50–150 per hour. Depends on school and
student
Teachers Self
Gifts to staff (sometimes
also to veterans)f
No Depends on school Unrecorded or informally
record
From 50 to 200 soms per
student
Sporadic Teachers –
Author’s elaboration with own data and data from Komitet po Obrazovaniyu, Nauke, Kulture, Informatsionnoy i Religioznoy Politike Jogorku Kenesha Kyrgyzskoy Respubliki (2011) and Sultanalieva et al. (2010).
aInformation about each item is based on evidence or testimonies, and does not mean that these payments are in use in all of the schools.
bData from the report of the parliamentary commission on informal payments in 2010 (Sultanalieva et al., 2010, 19).
cTransferring between grades or graduating from a school.
dParents do not pay a fee directly to increase teachers’ salaries, but the amount of money devoted to these supplements is taken from the fund. On average between 40% and 60% of the fund is dedicated to
salaries.
eAll the categories marked with * refer to either monthly payments or sporadic payments. The amount refers to the total collected.
fIn some schools, parents are asked to contribute to the collection and to sign a letter assessing they did so voluntarily.
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the nomenklatura studied English. In 1996 the Bilim Na-
tional Education Program was approved with the objective
of introducing pupil-centered education, and among other
schools, gymnasiums and lyceums (vocational training) were
included within the program. Gymnasiums (of which there
were 111 in Kyrgyzstan in 2010) are specialized schools
which enjoy privileges as additional public funding, includ-
ing 15% extra for staff salaries, and a license to offer paid
education services (DOPU). Run by Gulayym Alieva since
1990, the so-called Trinashka was one of the ﬁrst gymna-
sium schools to specialize in English. This granted it great
prestige, allowing the administration to demand high in-
formal payments from parents and, in 1999, to set up a fund
to support the school, called OF Oy Bulak, which will be the
main instrument used by the management to collect and
distribute the parental informal payments.
At that time Trinashka already was an elitnaya, an un-
oﬃcial status that distinguished the state schools where the
children of the upper-middle class and even the upper class
went. The presence of ethnic Russians and Russian speak-
ing Kyrgyz among parents, and also among school personnel,
is much higher than the national average.4 Within the
Trinashka’s parents are businessmen, senior oﬃcials within
the administration and employees of banks and multina-
tionals. They are the strongest link within the Kyrgyzstani
society. Their incomes range from $600 to $4000. Many of
the school’s graduating students enter the “commercial”
(contracted) branch (kontraktniyie) of the public universi-
ty system, the most prestigious and expensive private
universities, such as the American University of Central Asia,
or even belong to the select group that study abroad.
The School No.21 was founded in 1989 as a nursery
school opened due to the establishment of the Enesay
novostroika on Bishkek’s northeastern periphery.Novostroikas
are new settlements that have been established since 1989.
From 1989 to 1991, their construction was part of the
General Housing Plan. Since then, the massive inﬂux of mi-
grants, particularly from the south, was not met with
adequate urban planning effort. In 1998 new land owner-
ship rights made the number of unauthorized land
occupations skyrocket.5 Houses were built overnight to avoid
eviction, and dozens of shantytowns sprung up all around
Bishkek in what is known as the Adobe Belt. Currently it is
estimated that between 250,000 and 300,000 people live
in the novostroikas of Bishkek. Hence, although the schools
No.13 and No.21. are urban in terms of their location, they
still represent an urban–rural divide in terms of their pop-
ulation. Nevertheless, when explaining the different
strategies of the schools, class and economic status are more
important as a social cleavage than the urban–rural one.
There are 48 novostroikas and many of them, especially
the most recent ones, do not have public utilities (electric-
ity, gas, water, sewage systems, waste collection and paved
roads) or offer basic social services such as healthcare and
schools. The main problems in terms of education are the
lack of schools and daycare centers (there are only 18 schools
in all of the novostroikas), the distance to available schools,
residents’ socioeconomic conditions (37% of students that
drop out of school do so because they cannot afford themost
basic necessities such as shoes and clothing, or they cannot
pay the fees, USAID Kyrgyzstan, 2010, 6) and the discrim-
ination that internal migrants suffer because of their origin,
social and economic status and because they lack the
propiska, the resident registration that grants access to the
full rights of citizenship (Nasritdinov, 2008). There are 2000
school-age children in the novostroikas who are not in school
(USAID Kyrgyzstan, 2010).
Living conditions differ from one novostroika to another.
While Enesay has all the essential utilities and services, in-
cluding a school, many of the students that attend live in
more disadvantaged novostroikas such as Dordoy 1 (estab-
lished in 2000), Dordoy 2 (2004), MTF, Almatynskaya and
Leninskaya. In the School No.21 most students are ﬁrst or
second generation internal migrants. About 200 students
out of a total of 1130 (17%) are migrants from other
novostroikas of the Adobe Belt. Around 80% of these fami-
lies come from the southern oblasts and many of them do
not speak Russian (Sultanalieva, 2011, 9). Most of the parents
work informally in the Dordoi bazaar with low wages, no
job security and in temporary jobs (the men working as taxi
drivers, tachkisty (longshoremen)) and laborers; the women
as street vendors, waitresses, seamstresses and sex workers;
and the children as waste and bag collectors, street vendors
and tachkisty. Withworkdays of 12 hours, 6 or 7 days aweek,
an adult earns between 7000 and 9000 soms ($150–190) a
month. None of the interviewees for this study has the
propiska, as only 5% of internal migrants are registered.
Overall, it is estimated that 25% of Bishkek’s residents are
not registered (Azimov & Azimov, 2009, 23). These parents
and their children are the weakest link.
4.2. The elitization strategy at the Trinashka versus the
survival strategy at the School No.21
School No.13 and School No.21 represent paradigms for
informal payments motivated by different objectives –
elitization versus survival – where engagement of givers in
informal payments is either by choice or by need, andwhere
the interaction with the formal institution is competing or
substitutive.
4.2.1. Elitization strategy and engagement by choice
At the Trinashka, the transaction is associated with the
acquisition of a better than average education, better fa-
cilities and higher social status. In terms of supply, the
speciﬁc purposes of the informal payments differentiate the
two schools in two fundamental aspects. First, in the ser-
vices they offer – as seen in Table 3; the quality and number
of services and the amount spent on them are much greater
in the 13th Gymnasium School. The principal herself con-
ﬁrms the interrelation between fees and the quality and
services of the school: “if we are forced to suppress the en-
rollment fees we would have to consider compensating by
4 As the per capita income of the ethnic Russian community and in a
lesser degree the Russian speaking Kyrgyz are well above the Kyrgyzstani
average, the relevance of this ‘cultural’ reference should be understoodmore
as a class distinction rather as an ethnic or a cultural one.
5 In Russia, illegal developments are called nakhalstroi, meaning
nakhal’naya zastroika. The term novostroika refers primarily to new de-
velopments which can be legal too. The high degree of unauthorized
constructions in new development areas has provoked the use of the term
to both mean new and illegal.
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Table 3
Parental informal payments in the School No.13 and the School No.21.
Items covered by informal paymentsa Amount in soms Transaction ﬂows through principals, teachers
or sponsor (OF Oy Bulak in School No.13).
No.13 No.21 No.13 No.21
Admission and late entry 10.000–20.000 0–3.000 Principal and Oy Bulak Principal
Other “gatekeeping opportunities”b – – Principal and Oy Bulak Principal
Supplementary payments to staffc 40% of contributions to Oy Bulak Not Known Principal and Oy Bulak Principal and teachers
Class supplies*,d Included in monthly payment: 800 Monthly: 250 Oy Bulak Teachers
Learning materials, equipment and technology 1000–2000 – Oy Bulak –
Repairs 1000–3000 – Principal and Oy Bulak Principal
Maintenance (including sporadic payments
of electricity, heating and cleaning services)*
Included in monthly payment: 700 Included in monthly payment: 250 soms Oy Bulak Class maintenance to teachers and
Heating, Electricity or cleaning
services to principal.
School events and visits 200–1000 50–300 Principal and teachers Teachers
Textbook rentale – – – Teachers
Security* Monthly: 250 Oy Bulak Teachers
Extracurricular activities (sport, arts, etc) 250–1000 soms – Principal and teachers –
Private tutoring lessons 300 soms per hour – Teachers –
Extra-group lessons 100 soms per hour 50 soms per hour Teachers Teachers
Gifts to staff (sometimes also to veterans)f 100–1000 soms 100 soms per student Principal and teachers Principal and teachers
Author’s elaboration with own data.
aInformation about each item is based on evidence or testimonies, and does not mean that these payments are in use in all of the schools.
bTransferring between grades or graduating from a school.
cParents do not pay a fee directly to increase teachers’ salaries, but the amount of money devoted to these supplements is taken from the fund. On average between 40% and 60% of the fund is dedicated to
salaries.
dAll the categories marked with * refer to either monthly payments or sporadic payments. The amount refers to the total collected.
eUnder Governmental order 619, 25 August 2006, payments for the rental of textbooks are eliminated.
fIn some schools, parents are asked to contribute to the collection and to sign a letter assessing they did so voluntarily.
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reducing English classes”.6 Secondly, two factors contrib-
ute to the quality of the teaching staff, as this is another
distinctive element which the 13th School offers. On the one
hand, the school attracts the teachers with the best resumes
because it offers higher wages. According to the school’s
Zavuch, after the 2011 wage reform the average teacher’s
salary is now 7500 soms ($158) a month, although there are
those who make only 5000 ($105). At the 13th School the
average is 20,000 soms ($422), depending on the number
of hours worked, seniority and the subjects taught. Without
counting the greater access school staff has to informal
income opportunities through private lessons or organiz-
ing events, 10,000 of those 20,000 soms are extra payments
resulting from the school’s ability to generate revenue. One
teacher admitted that she would not come to work if there
were no extra payments.
On the other hand, the problem the School No.21 has
keeping new teaching staff is unheard of at the Trinashka.
The Enesay Zavuch conﬁrmed that the majority of new
teachers complete their mandatory three years to obtain
their degrees and then leave; there are near-permanent va-
cancies in speciﬁc subjects such asmathematics, the sciences
and computer science. In contrast, the Trinashka’s Zavuch’s
story is the opposite: “Our teachers only leave to emigrate
to Russia, but that’s fairly uncommon. They know that they
can prosper here. Furthermore, here everyone teaches their
own subject, we don’t have PE teachers doingmath classes”.7
Among the residents of the Trinashka school’s micro dis-
trict, there are those who choose to pay the enrollment fee,
those who enroll their children in other, cheaper schools,
and those (a minority) who, after threatening to sue the
school, have managed to have their children admitted
without paying the fee. Out of a total of 375 children re-
siding in the Trinashka micro district, only 202 are enrolled
in the school when their classrooms receive more than 1500
students (Sultanalieva et al., 2010, 6–7). Hence, there are
173 students out of 375 who have moved to other dis-
tricts’ schools, allegedly because School No. 13 demands it.
For them, higher enrollment fees and other informal pay-
ments are a barrier to get access to Education.
In contrast, much more aﬄuent parents are attracted by
the academic prestige and the social credential (Collins,
1979) attached to the Trinashka. There, the number of ap-
plicants each year vastly outnumbers the number of available
places. As a result, many parents offer to pay the enroll-
ment fee to try to guarantee their children’s admission. The
existence of such a fee was conﬁrmed by the school’s Zavuch,
who explained that “there is a fee of between 5000 and
20,000 soms depending on the family’s resources. Those who
cannot pay are given the possibility of offering books or tech-
nology instead”.8 The parents consulted in this study speak
of paying between 10,000 and 20,000 soms, quantities which
have been in place for years as admission in 2002 cost 15,000
soms ($326 dollars at the exchange rate of the time).
The monthly fee at the Trinashka averages between 500
and 800 soms depending on the grade. At the elitnaya school,
the money is deposited directly in the bank and goes to the
OF Oy Bulak fund. The money is spent on renovations, stan-
dard repairs (heating, elevators, rooﬁng, ﬁre alarms, etc.),
to complement staff salaries and on other ﬁxed expenses,
such as security, books and material for the media library.
The largest portion is dedicated to salaries, between 40 and
60% depending on the year, while another 40% is dedi-
cated to renovations and repairs. Other expenses are covered
with what remains.
Although a ﬁrst ﬁlter is already done when paying en-
rollment fee, students’ parents still have differences of
opinion regarding the informal payments. Those who live
in the school’s micro district, whether from wealthy fami-
lies or not, cannot legally be denied admission to the school
and are generally critical of the high informal payments,
whereas those who live in other areas and send their chil-
dren to the Trinashka because of its prestige, are usuallymore
compliant. They constitute themajority and engage by choice
in informal payments oriented to upgrading and de facto
privatizing a public school. One parent, a businessman by
profession, stated his view as follows: “I don’t mind paying;
we know that education here is very good. Our daughters
already speak two other languages, which would be im-
possible elsewhere, and studying here opens many doors”.
Indeed, the major division among parent’s views is not di-
rectly related to informal payments, but indirectly because
of the opaque management of the budget by the school’s
principal that concluded in the opening of an investiga-
tion by the Attorney General and the Financial Police
(Finansovaya Politsya or FIN Politsy) (Shabdanova, 2012).
4.2.2. Survival strategy and engagement by necessity
Kyrgyzstan has a policy of decentralizing budget au-
thorities, but the ﬁnancial resources of general education
are formed centrally, with 65% of the funds for this sector
coming from national budget revenues and only 35% coming
from local budget revenue. It is important to note that while
in Bishkek 100% of the budget depends on local revenues,
there are individual oblasts where this amounts to no more
than 4 to 7% of education funding. Schools in these oblasts
face serious diﬃculties in ﬁnding teaching staff and gath-
ering resources to maintain good conditions. More diﬃcult
conditions and greater community involvement explain why
the purest survival strategy paradigm is found in rural areas,
where individuals’ perception of being engaged in a broader
social goal is sharper.
At the Enesay School, the public ﬁnancing does not cover
all the common needs of a standard school according to
Kyrgyzstani law. At the 21st School, funds are invested – as
explained to the parents – on different items, such as minor
repairs (plumbers and electricians), purchasing class sup-
plies, and hiring a security guard or equipment (among
which a television would typically be the most expensive).9
6 Interview with 13th School’s principal in KNEWS, available at:
<http://m.knews.kg/ru/society/11247/> (Last accessed 11 July 2014).
7 Interview with the School No.13 Zavuch, November 2011.
8 See footnote 7.
9 Regarding security, after denying that the school paid for private se-
curity, the Zavuch said that security only received a salary from the state;
however, the deputy director of Bishkek’s education department said that
the state does not cover the costs of private security and that “if a school
has security the parents have paid for it”. Interview to Natalya Sukhodubova,
Deputy Manager of the Education Department of the city of Bishkek, No-
vember 2011. Interview with School 21st Zavuch, November 2011.
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The school personnel require some ﬁnancial help from
parents in the form of fees as well as voluntary and non-
voluntary informal payments. As it happened at the
Trinashka, a sector of the parents agrees with the idea of
supporting ﬁnancially the school to see that the basic con-
ditions have been established, but not to upgrade them over
the average. They accept informal payments by necessity
but also with the perception that they are supporting a social
goal. A second group of parents that do not support the idea
of making an effort for the survival of the school still pay
because they do not want their children to be excluded or
disadvantaged. Parental informal payments at School No.
21 have favored the survival of a welfare institution but have
also confronted the parents with a much more glaring
dilemma than at the Trinashka: pay for your children’s
schooling or accept that they will probably not go to school.
According to a study conducted by the NGO ErEp in Dordoy
2 and 10 other novostroikas, 65% of parents interviewed
claimed to have paid fees for their children’s enrollment in
school,10 while a study of all the novostroikas found this per-
centage to be 47% (Sultanalieva, 2011, 10).
For many poor families from Dordoy 1 and 2, the sum
of the informal payments and other costs (clothing, trans-
portation, food, etc.) makes schooling either unaffordable
or so diﬃcult that education is treated as an extra cost. This
leads to the non-schooling of children and their integra-
tion into themost vulnerable segments of the labormarket.11
As an alternative measure there are some parents from
Dordoy-1 and 2who enroll their children in boarding schools
for children with disabilities, such as the Chuyskaya Shkola-
internat: “A friend told me about the boarding school and
I was able to leave my children there from 2003 to 2007
without having to pay. When they entered they were 6 and
8 and had never been to school”.12
At the Trinashka the enrollment process is organized in
a methodized andmarketedmanner. On the contrary, at the
School No.21 improvisation is the rule as there are all kind
of cases given for the pairs non-admittance or admittance
and the requirement of informal payment and no require-
ment of payment. A peddler from Dordoy 1 said that her son
was denied enrollment without being asked to pay, because
of a lack of available places: “I think if I had paid they would
have accepted him, but they didn’t ask”. This was not the
case in other instances, such as that of a seamstress from
a barak in Dordoy-1, who the school administration asked
for “3000 soms ($64) for admittance; as I didn’t have the
money my girl didn’t go to school for the rest of the year”.
Several mothers said that although they paid monthly fees
and other occasional expenses they did not have to pay an
enrollment fee. There are other cases where parents did have
to pay, and the payments were not made by bank deposit
or transfer as in the 13th School, but following much more
traditional methods. A Dordoy bazaar bag seller describes
the situation: “In 2008 a friend and I went to talk to the prin-
cipal to sign up our children and she asked us pay 1500 soms
for each child. She told us we needed to make an appoint-
ment to hand in the necessary documents and at that time
we should bring the money. They didn’t tell us if there were
places or not, only how to make the payment”.13
The 21st School’s Zavuch was initially reluctant to ac-
knowledge any kind of informal payments at the school
or that students soliciting admissionwere rejected. However,
after hearing about the testimony of mothers who claimed
to have paid because they were told that if they did not
there might not be a place available for their children, she
conceded “if that is the case you may be right but I can’t
conﬁrm it because I’m not responsible for student enroll-
ment”. She did not defend the school or its administration
very ﬁercely. Another teacher said that the school tries not
to turn any families away, but that sometimes there are
not enough places. In short, in contrast with the standard-
ization of the process and themarketed planning of revenue
and expenses at the Trinashka, at the Enesay School, the
constraints (number of students, the economic needs of
the school and its personnel) condition the administr-
ation’s actions regarding payments, which are not pre-
established. Thus, whereas parents whose children go to
the 13th School know they will have to pay and know the
quantities of the fees beforehand, at the 21st School every-
thing is contingent.
Survival of the school, among other payments, is also sup-
ported by a monthly fee of between 150 and 250 soms at
the School No.21. At the elitnaya school the money is de-
posited directly in the bank and goes to the OF Oy Bulak,
but at the Enesay School the children bring the money to
class and it is collected by the starosta klasa (class presi-
dent) and given to the teacher, who then passes it on to the
school administration.
4.2.3. Competing and substitutive interaction with formal
public education
Applying the theoretical categories established by Helmke
and Levitsky (2004) to analyze the interaction between
formal and informal institutions, two distinct types of in-
teraction are useful in this research: substitutive and
competing. Most schools requiring parental informal pay-
ments are guided by the principle of survival. In the absence
of suﬃcient public funding they look for self-ﬁnancing al-
ternatives to mainly substitute state functions while sharing
their formal outcomes. However, while private contribu-
tions allow schools to survive, they also produce serious
consequences for poor households, the most tragic being
the exclusion of poor children from the education system.
As a result, access to educationmay be at themercy of school
personnel who occasionally apply exemptions or dis-
counts, assessing payments on a need–means basis. These
10 The data were provided by Mirzad Adzhlev, director of ErEP, during
an interview in November 2011. The study by ErEp is part of the USAID
Sapattuu Bilim project.
11 Among similar statements, one single mother of three children ex-
plained that “after arriving in Bishkek I didn’t send my two older children
(born in 1986 and 1990) to school. They’ve never gone to school. Between
what I had to pay for them to go and what we needed it was too expen-
sive. It was better that they earned money for food and to help me take
care of the youngest one. We took turns, and now they work as tachkisty”.
12 Interview with a mother of two children with residence in Dordoy 1,
24 October 2011.
13 Interviews carried out in October and November 2011 in the Dordoy
1 and Dordoy 2 novostroikas.
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evaluations of personhood are also present at the elitnayas
schools. Schools such as the Trinashka operate under a
market strategy aimed at generating proﬁt. Here, informal
payments are higher and aimed at both improving the ac-
ademic level of the school and as a tool of social stratiﬁcation
to secure the recruitment of pupils from the upper-middle
and upper classes. The elitization and de facto privatiza-
tion of public schools produce a competing interaction with
formal public education outcomes.
4.2.4. Competing interaction and the commodiﬁcation of
education at Elitnayas schools
The logic of the internal functioning, management and
setting of institutional goals at the Trinashka is absolutely
dependent on an understanding of the school as a busi-
ness and students as customers. This can be seen in the
enrollment procedures and in the management of private
contributions, which are quantitatively equivalent to the
amount of money received from the state.
As shown in Table 4, the ratio of students per teacher
is higher in the School No.21 (19.8) than in the 13th (14.4),
although paradoxically, the opposite is true in number of
students per class (25 vs. 31), and in howmuch the schools
are over their purported capacity (1.68 times for Trinashka
vs. 1.34 for Enesay). This difference in ratios is also present
in the aggregate values for all elitnaya schools compared
to other schools. A likely explanation is that the demand
for places in elitnaya schools is much higher than the supply,
establishing a favorable relationship between revenue and
expenditure per student. This leads these schools to in-
crease the number of students per class; however, they are
unable to increase the number of classes because of lack
of space so their response is to hire more teachers. In other
words, the lack of space in Bishkek’s public schools is a struc-
tural problem and both schools respond by duplicating shifts,
but the 13th School has an additional economic incentive
to apply market criteria to revenue (accepting more stu-
dents) and costs (hiring more teachers), resulting in an
increase in the ratio of students to school capacity, while
the School No.21, which does not have “clients” with re-
sources, has very little or no incentive to do so.
In addition, the enrollment method is modeled to allow
the selection of customers. Although it is illegal, the 13th
School tests students newly enrolled in the ﬁrst grade as a
pressure mechanism; in fact, this practice is included in the
school’s statutes, in article 3.2 (Sultanalieva et al., 2010, 7–8).
As many parents offer donations to the school or provide
information about their incomes and business activity, this
mechanism gives the school managers the capacity to accept
or reject new pupils based on their future as customers as
well as bestow the chance to incorporate brilliant stu-
dents who will back the image of the institution as a
prestigious one.
The depth, degree and complexity of the commodiﬁca-
tion of a school affect the organization and functioning of
informal payments. In this sense, the greatest contrast
between the schools I am examining is the presence at the
13th Gymnasium School of a sponsoring organization or
fund, like the OF (Obshestveny Fond, Social Fund) Oy Bulak
of the 13th Gymnasium School, which serves as an inter-
mediary in the transactions between the parents and the Ta
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school.14 According to Guljamal Sultanalieva, a member of
the 2010 parliamentary research commission, the OF Oy
Bulak had an annual budget equal to the school’s oﬃcial
budget. In the period between 2008 and 2011 the OF Oy
Bulak collected more than 48 million soms (around $1
million dollars).15 In comparison with the School No.21, the
presence of a fund has eased themanagement of large sums
of money, it has fostered the standardization of payment
amounts and payment terms and it has modernized
payment methods by including bank deposits.
Additionally, because of the fund, transactions take place
outside the classroom and the students are not involved,
avoiding the psychological pressure on children whose
parents are late with their payments or unable to pay.16 This
does not mean that payments in the 13th School are vol-
untary or that parents are not pressured into paying;
however, the manner in which parents are coerced into
paying differs from the School No.21, where pressure and
harassment, when it exists, is directed at both parents and
students indiscriminately and could take place within the
classroom. At the Trinashka students are usually excluded
from the process, but their parents are not only urged to
comply with the regular payments but also to put their chil-
dren in private classes or even take them to other schools
to free up places so that additional admission fees may be
collected.
It is clear that parental involvement in the manage-
ment of payments has not been one of the objectives of the
OF Oy Bulak. The principal herself and some of the teach-
ers have conﬁrmed that the fund was set up by the school
in 1999 mainly to provide economic support for the staff.17
Thus, the administration maintained control over the fund
and the handling of issues such as setting admission fees
andmonthly payments, what money is spent on, and which
companies are contracted to provide speciﬁc services. All
of this is acknowledged by the principal, who says the fund’s
functions are limited to controlling and accounting for the
collection and expenditure of money, although she alsomen-
tions that expenses proposed by the school must be
approved by the assembly.18
4.3. Access to education and the two faces of parental
informal payments as substitutive of the state
There is no doubt that in Kyrgyzstan parental informal
payments have been a key source of funding for the sur-
vival of the schools, acting as a substitute for the state.
However, in a time of rapid decline in public resources, it
was not the only social and informal response that helped
guarantee social reproduction in the education sector. Es-
pecially in rural areas, behaviors such as teachers continuing
to teach after retirement, making repairs for free or pro-
viding transport for students at no charge, were also
everyday practices that substituted for the state and made
the survival of basic education possible. However, in urban
areas where community life is not as pervasive and the iso-
lation of poor families is greater, the same parental payments
that allow teachers to improve their meager salaries, to buy
new equipment and so on, can lead to children from dis-
advantaged households remaining outside of the education
system. Sometimes the impact of these two faces of pa-
rental informal payments regarding access to education is
mediated by school personnel who assess informal contri-
butions on a needs–means logic, introducing exemptions
and discounts. Nevertheless, the perverse effects of infor-
mal payments cannot be ignored, not only because of the
number of children out of school but also because of the
vulnerability of poor pupils facing psychological pressure
and unequal treatment.
In fact, when talking about basic education in Kyrgyz-
stan, themost important informal payments are gatekeeping
fees, the standardization of which in urban areas leaves little
space for reciprocity between school personnel and parents.
Hence, while parental informal payments “mitigate the
failing of the state by providing resources”, it is not so clear
that they mitigate the failure of the state to provide access
to education by “making decisions” [of street level bureau-
crats], as it has been pointed out by Morris and Polese
regarding higher education (Morris & Polese, 2014). Reci-
procity and evaluations of personhood are essential concepts
to understand the cultural embeddedness of diverse econo-
mies (Caldwell, 2004; Clarke, 2002; Morris & Polese, 2014);
both emphasize the importance of assessing payments on
a needs–means interrelationship between the giver and the
receiver. This kind of interrelationship is present in many
types of payments in Kyrgyzstani schools, but is stronger
when the relationship between parents and personnel has
already been established. That is, evaluations of person-
hood are not as decisive in the instances when access to
education is at stake. There, where evaluations of person-
hood are more needed, that is, in the novostroikas, the lack
of schools in most of the micro districts and the huge un-
registered population place school principals in a diﬃcult
position, wanting to be compassionate toward the chil-
dren from other novostroikas. While principals have no
obligation to enroll students from other micro districts, they
can be tempted to take advantage of the context and ask
for informal contributions.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, both the School No.13
and the School No.21 offer a range of exemptions and dis-
counts in the gatekeeping andmonthly payments. Regarding
the Trinashka the parliamentary research commission even
14 Interview with Guljamal Sultanalieva, November 2011.
15 Shavdanova, Asel, “Direktor shkoly No. 13: My ne mogli oboytis bez
pomoshi roditeley”, Vecherny Bishkek 12.10.2012, Available at:
<http://www.vb.kg/202616> (Last accessed 11 July 2014).
16 There are recordings with hidden cameras in Bishkek schools which
show teachers pressuring the students whose parents are late with their
payments; in some cases teachers insult the students or use physical vi-
olence. One example is a recording from the 91st School, in which the
teacher insults and hits students while asking them how she is going to
explain to the principal that she has not collected the money from all of
the students in the class. Available at: <Svodka.akipress.com>, V shkole No.91
uchitelya rugayut shkolnikov, kotorye ne prinesli dengi, 9th December 2011,
<http://svodka.akipress.org/news:105041> (Last accessed 11 July 2014).
17 The principal’s opinion in: Direktor Kompleks-litseya No.13: Uchitelya
gotovy obyavit zabastobku, esli obvineniya v adres shkoly ne prekratyatsya,
KNEWS 20 February 2012, <http://www.knews.kg/ru/society/11247/> (Last
accessed 11 July 2014). Teacher’s testimony in: Pedagogi bishkekskoy shkoly
No.13 zayavlyayut, chto “ataka” na direktora i kollektiv neobosnovanna, OTRK,
27 February 2012, <http://ktrk.kg/rus/index.php?newsid=3625> (Last ac-
cessed 11 July 2014).
18 Direktor Kompleks-litseya No.13: Uchitelya gotovy obyavit zabastobku,
esli obvineniya v adres shkoly ne prekratyatsya, KNEWS 20 February 2012,
<http://www.knews.kg/ru/society/11247/> (Last accessed 11 July 2014).
216 R. Ruiz Ramas / Journal of Eurasian Studies 7 (2016) 205–219
collected a list called “Release of parents from voluntary pay-
ments”, which detailed the beneﬁciaries and the categories
of persons entitled to a 50% or a 100% discount: orphans,
children from single parent families and the children of
teachers. In the 2009/2010 academic term 46% of the ben-
eﬁciaries were children of teachers (Sultanalieva et al., 2010,
17). At the School No.21 there are also waivers for widows,
as one widowedmother explained “whenmy husband died
I asked them to waive my fees and I had to show them the
certiﬁcate proving I was a widow”. At both schools, there
are also discounts for the number of children enrolled: “I
paid 20,000 soms for my ﬁrst child, 15,000 for my second
and 12,000 for my third”19; “I had to pay for my ﬁrst two
sons but the principal allowed me not to pay for the en-
rollment of my third soon”.20
Regarding monthly payments, according to the
Trinashka’s Zavuch, “poor families or those who are unable
to pay for a time must write a request for the fees to be for-
given (…) there are few who have done it, usually they
simply catch upwith their late payments when they are able
to (…) this might happen with approximately 100 of the
1600 students in the school, about two per class”.21 This
statement shows that the payment is not voluntary, and that
in fact, it is treated as if it were a market transaction: if the
client is unable to pay he/she is required to request autho-
rization to delay payment or an exemption. At the 21st
school, several parents admit to having borrowed money
to make payments because if they had not done so “the
teacher tells the children in front of the whole class and it’s
an uncomfortable situation”. Parents knowwho has not paid,
although it is not common for them to pressure others
because of it, although there are cases of parents who
suggest paying more to improve conditions in the school.
At Enesay, parents can pay the whole year at once and they
are also invited to make additional contributions. Accord-
ing to a couple of mothers, “the teachers treat the children
of these parents better. They sit at the front of the class, near
the teacher, and they get more attention”. Therefore, how
exemptions are decided upon and administered exempli-
ﬁes not only that payments are not voluntary, but also that
they have more impact in the household, which are already
familiar to the school personnel.
5. Conclusions
According to the transitional discourse, parental infor-
mal payments are a product of the Soviet legacy destined
to disappear. The introduction of mechanisms to formal-
ize the co-ﬁnancing and commodiﬁcation of public
education has been justiﬁed as a means of providing greater
transparency in the raising of revenues and their manage-
ment. However, these informal practices have shown great
capacity to adapt to institutional vehicles supporting the neo-
liberal transformation of public education, and eventually,
have facilitated the informal elitization of a select number
of schools. The fact that formal public and private funding
are still insuﬃcient has contributed to this, as has the fact
that state (Ruiz Ramas, 2013) and economic institutions
(Nasritdinov et al., 2010; UNDP Kyrgyzstan, 2006) are still
dominated by informal practices that not only protect petty
interests but also fulﬁll social functions that are not suc-
cessfully covered by the legal realm.
The resilience of informal practices in the public school
is due to, above all, the place these practices have in the func-
tioning and survival of this formal institution.When the state
fails to respect its obligations, the administration del-
egates the carrying out of the ﬁnancing of the school to staff
and parents. The state only takes responsibility for the sala-
ries of teachers, principals and other staff, their contributions
to social security and the costs of building new schools, gen-
erally omitting other ﬁxed costs without which a school
cannot function. The state has relied on informal funding
to meet the objectives of legislation regarding education
(Dobretsova & Gaybulina, 2011). Paying for equipment,
school renovations, educational and oﬃce material, main-
tenance and external services, as well as complementing
teachers’ low salaries, have been left to individual schools,
which, for the most part, have been unable to successfully
market their services in the context of an economic crisis.
The relationship of mutual dependence between formal and
informal funding has been vital in maintaining the educa-
tion system.
This panorama of mutual need between the school and
the parents reveals one side of the interconnection between
the formal and the informal, where the latter ‘substitutes’
for the former as it does not function eﬃciently. There is
another side driven by a market and proﬁt oriented strat-
egy that competes with the institutional logic of universal
public education. There are two models of parental infor-
mal payments, which we have differentiated into three
different theoretical categories: survival versus elitization
strategy behind school’s self-ﬁnancing, engagement in in-
formal payments by need versus engagement by choice, and
a substitutive interaction with a formal institution versus
a competing one. Nevertheless, there is still a shadow side
to parental informal payments in Kyrgyzstani schools. Ac-
cording to the [anonymous] testimony of various experts
and practitioners, this shadow side reveals the creative par-
ticipation of senior oﬃcials in the education sector in
designing and activating informal payment systems in
Bishkek’s schools during the second half of the 1990s. These
systems, apart from fostering informal self-ﬁnancing in
schools under parents’ responsibility, also sustained complex
structures of corruption and extortion throughwhichmoney
was transferred from the schools to the oﬃcials them-
selves with the collaboration of school principals, who it is
safe to assume, also took a share. Unfortunately, corrup-
tion schemes reached both the strongest and the weakest
links, as a director of an NGO with experience in the
novostroikas stated “corruption affects not only the elite
schools; even in the slums a substantial amount of money
paid by parents does not pay for materials or teachers, but
goes to the department of education”.22
19 Interview with a School No.13 parent, August 2011.
20 Interview with a School No.21 parent, November 2011.
21 See footnote 7. 22 Anonymous interview with an NGO leader, November 2011.
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